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Highlights:
. Excessive tax
incentives could
potentially trigger
"tax war" between
neighboring countries.
o lntegration of the
ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC)
could potentially
trigger "race to the
bottom", as in the
European Union and
African regions.
o Agreement among
ASEAN countries'
governments is
crucial in order to
keep the tax rate at a
reasonable level that
does not inflict to
lose-lose situation for
all ASEAN countries.
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he lndonesian government plans
to expand, simplify, and extend the
duratron of tax holiday policy up to
20 years to boost foreign investmeni.
This might provoke tax competition with
neighboring countries, and trigger race to the
bottom among ASEAN countries, especrally
after the implementation of lhe ASEAN
Economic Community (AEC) late r this year.
ln the region with integrated economy such
as European Union or the one that is less
integrated such as Africa, race to the bottom
phenomenon had taken place.Taxwar will bring
all the countries in a lose-lose situaiion, whrle
the super low tax will result in potential loss of
state revenues. For lndonesia, this means that
the target achievement of 16 pe rcent tax ratio
according lo Ndwocito (Nine Priorities) will be
harder to achieve. Therefore, coordination and
agreement between ASEAN countries to avoid
using excessive low tax instrument to invite
investors are urgently needed.
Tax Holiday, lnvestment, and Tax Revenue
The lndonesian Government plans to broaden
the implementation of tax holiday to nine
rndustry, extends the durat on up to 20 years,
and simplifies the application process. Whiie
in the previous policy tax holiday can only be
issued through consultation wrth the president,
now it can be provided only through the Minister
of Finance decree. The purpose is very clear: to
bring the investors in.
Tax holiday is not a new policy in Indonesra, but
over time, the results we re far below expectation.
ln the 1970s when tax holiday policy was
enacted, there was no significant investment
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lmplementation of the
coming to lndonesta. lnstead, when the polrcy
revoked in 1984 and there was no special tax
incentives policy, Foreign Direct Investment (FDl)
increased rapidly (Nainggolan, 2004).
Research from Banga (2003) in 17 Asian
countries including Indonesia concluded that
tax incentives had no significant impacts on the
increase of FDI inflowsr. Research from Dewi
(ZOtZ)also concluded that tax holiday does not
significantly influence the investment decision2.
Even without tax holiday, lndonesia already
has many potential resources to attract the
i nvesto rs.
0n the other hand, tax holiday facility most
likely can be exploited by "deceitful" companies
to avoid taxes, Old companies might create a
"new" company to gain tax holiday facility. This
can be carried out particularly by abusing weak
tax adminrstration in the developing countries
such as lndonesia or by employing sophisticated
concealment techniques, which have been
proved in the tax evasion cases of a number of
multinational companies (0ECD, 201 4).
Tax holiday could a so potentially eliminate a
huge amount of state revenues. Findings from
a study in 20 developing countries indicate
that the exemption of corporate income tax
can eliminate potentral tax revenue of around
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Table 1
Tax rates in ASEAN Countries
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Brunei 20 0 0 0
Cambodia 20 10 20 20
lndonesia 25 10 5 30
Laos 24 10 0 24
Malavsia 25 5-10 0 26
Mvanmar 5-40 0 t 35
Philippines 30 12 5 32
Sinsapore !7 7 0 2Q
Thailand 20 7 5 37
Vietnam 22 10 5 35
Source: ASEAN Briefing, 2014
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Source: Taxation trends rn the European Union, 2014 (modified)
0.5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP)3.
lf these findings are applied in the context of
lndonesia, it means that potential loss of revenue
from tax reaches more than IDR 50 trillion, which
is equivalent to the budget of government's one
million house program (subsidized housing program
for the poor).
Tax Cornpetition towards the lmplementation
of ASEAN Economic Community
It is clear that tax holiday does not necessarily
attract investment while it potentially reduce state
revenue. Furthermore, this policy can also trigger
tax competition with the neighboring countries.
The possibility for such competition to take place
would be greater, especially because the increasing
economic integration with neighboring couniries
through the ASEAN Economic Community can
push the spillover effect faster.
To date, tax rates in ASEAN countries are
greatly varred. Personal income tax rates
ranged from 0 percent in Brunei to 37
percent rn Thailand, while corporate income
tax rates ranged from the lowest 17 percent
in Singapore to the highest 40 percent in
Myanmar, Value added tax ranged from
0 percent rn Brunei and Myanmar lo 12
percent in Philippines (see Tab e 1). Extreme
variation of tax rates range will motivate
tax reduction for countries with higher tax
rates.
Tax competition had already taken place
prior to the implementation of the ASEAN
Economic Community (AEC). ln 2006 (a year
before the AEC blueprini was published)
until 2015, all ASEAN-6 countrres have been
lowering their corporate income tax rates.
This reduction is not going to stop since
the Philippines is planning to lower their
corporate income tax to 20 percent by 2019,
while Malaysra will reduce the tax rate to
24 percent in 2016, and Vietnam will lower
corporate income tax to 20 percent. These
reductions will likely trigger other couniries
to take similar actions'.
ln fact, competition among countries in ASEAN
to attract foreign investment by providing tax
incentives had been started even more than a
decade ago, until recent years. Back in '1996, in the
competition to lure investment from the General
Motors, the Philippines offered corporate income
tax exemption for 8 years and Thailand offered
similar exemption, with an additional '15 million
dollars grant for training facilities. ln 2001, to
appeal investme nt from Canon, Vietnam provided
corporate income tax exemption for 10 years, but
the Philippines competed Vietnam by changing
its regulation and gave corporate income tax
exemption from B to 12 yearss. Recently, in 2014,
in order to entice Samsung's investment, lndonesia
offered the exemption of corporate income tax for
10 years while Vietnam offered 15 years.
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Tax competition in the European Union
ASEAN should learn from tax competition
phenomenon that has led to race to the bottom
among. the European Union countries. The rat
race in the region started with lreland. ln 1998,
as the result of lreland's policy in lowering
tax rates to a very drastic and surprisrng level,
other EU membe r countries then followed the
race, thus lreland is dubbed "the sick man of
Europe "6. Since '1998, tax rates among EU
countries had been dropped significantly (see
Fig u re '1).
ln 2011, the average corporate tax rates rn the
EU was 23 percent, over ten percent decrease
from 1998 rate which was 34 percent. After
2011, tax reductron rate still decline, but not
as rapid as in the previous period, since the tax
rates have already been quite low and there have
already a number of collective efforts to prevent
harmful tax competition by taking an action of tax
harmonization.
Due to the concern of the European Commission
and some OECD member countries regarding such
"unhealthy" competition, they took a number of
efforts to harmonize taxes. Member tountries
then signed the Common Corporote Tox Bose
(CCTB) agreement, which is not only meant for tax
harmonization, but also to reduce the complexity
and compliance costs, including the transfer
pricing problems.
Race to the Bottom in Africa
Research from the lnternotionol Monetory Fund
(lMF) concluded that race to the bottom in terms
of tax competition also proved to be occurred in
AfricaT. Another research from the IMF mentioned
that in 1980, as many as 40 percent of African
countries offered tax holiday, the number then
doubled to B0 percent in 20058. With such tight
competition, findings in Africa proved that there is
no relationship between tax holidays and foreign
investmente.
Even with almost zero tax incentive, the amount
of foreign investment will not necessarily increase
(see Figure 2) in African countries. From the data in
Figure 2, it appears that the reduced tax rate will
increase FDI at first, but in the end while tax rates
continuously lowered, the FDI was also declined.
ln conclusion, the IMF admitted that race to the
bottom does take place in Africa. This is quite
surprising, because the instrtution is known for its
conservative views that favor low tax rates. This
indicates the harmful tax competition in Africa,
which is worrying this conservative institution.
Even with numerous bad impacts, there is no
serious action from the African countries to
organize tax harmonization in order to prevent
race to the bottom.
Conclusion
From research findings that have. been mentioned
previously, it is clear that tax holiday does not
necessarily increase foreign investment. Tax is
actually just one of many determinrng factors for
investment. Businessmen from China, for instance,
mentioned that complicated bureaucracy is the
major problem in lndonesia before infrastructure
and electricity, after which is tax rateslo. lt is not
much different from the survey conducted by AT
Kearney and a survey of Japanese businessmen
UETRO) who invest in lndonesia.
Research from Dewi (ZOtZ) also concluded that
without tax holiday, lndonesia is actually an
Figure 2
Corporate lncome Tax Rates
and FDI to GDP ratio in Africa
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attractive country to to invest. Therefore,
the government must focus on the major
determinants that affect the investment
climate and the entire surrounding problems
that need to be fixed. With fourth largest
population in the world, rapidly growing
middle class, the openness of the society,
along with rich natural resources and natural
beauty, lndonesia is too attractive to be
ig n ored.
As a matter a fact, the government does not
need to put excessive effort in attracting
FDl. The classic research from Sritua Arief
(1993) reminded that within ten years period,
FDI which focused on domestic market will
generate total profits that will be"repatriated
to their country of origin in greater sum
than the initial capital invested (net capital
outflow). Export-oriented FDI which imported
all materials and components from companies
within the same group (intra-trade) have
more or less similar disadvantageous impact.
ln the context of the integration of ASEAN
Economic Community, lessons are learned
from the experience of European Union
and Africa. lt is clear that an increasingly
rntegrated region might promote harmful
tax competition. To anticipate "race to the
bottom", coordination and agreement among
countries to avoid low tax instruments is
required. When the race to the bottom took
place, ASEAN countries and their people are
the ones that will suffer the most.
Based on various data and research that
have been presented above, we propose the
fol lowing recommendations:
1. Head of State and Ministers of Finance
of ASEAN member countries need to
agree on the agenda to avoid excessive
tax instruments in the ASEAN economic
integration (AEC) im plementation.
2. The Indonesian government needs to
prioritize bureaucratic reforms with
targets and strrct supervision to support
the business climate. The governtnent
has stated that the nation's investment
is focused on infrastructure and energy,
but as long as the bureaucracy remains
complicated and invisible cost remains
high, the investment climate remains
disappointing no matter how low the tax
rate is"
3, The Indonesian government needs
to establish research and innovation
budget allocation of at least 2 percent of
the GDP to support domestic business,
innovaiion, production, and science in
order to develop economic and social
potential by the country itself.
Written by Setyo Budiantoro, Executive
Director Perkumpu lan Prakarsa (sbudiantoro@
thepra ka rsa.org)
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